A United Kingdom national was sentenced on 17 November to 72 months in US federal prison for his part in a conspiracy that used text-message phishing to break into at least a dozen companies, then turned the stolen data against individuals to drain more than $11.6 million in cryptocurrency. He was the last of five defendants to be sentenced in the Central District of California case, which concerned an operation that ran from September 2021 to April 2023. For defenders, the case is a documented record of a playbook that still works: lure employees with a text that appears to come from their employer or one of its IT suppliers, harvest their logins, and use what is found inside to defeat SMS-based second factors on personal accounts.
What the court record establishes
The defendant entered guilty pleas in April to two counts, a wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft, so the facts below come from an admitted plea agreement rather than untested charges. He has been held in federal custody since April 2025. The judge has set a separate hearing on 11 December to decide restitution, so the amount he must repay is not yet fixed.
Under the plea agreement, the group went after interactive entertainment firms, telecommunications carriers, technology companies, business process outsourcing (BPO) and IT service suppliers, cloud communications providers and cryptocurrency businesses, alongside private individuals. The Justice Department has not named the affected companies, and neither do we.
The four co-defendants, all US residents living in Texas, Florida and North Carolina, have already pleaded guilty and been sentenced. Their terms range from two years to ten years in federal prison; two received 45 months each.
How the intrusions worked
The entry point was the employee’s phone, not the corporate perimeter. Conspirators sent hundreds of SMS messages to staff at targeted companies, dressed up as notices from the employer itself or from an IT or BPO contractor the employer relied on. Each message carried a link to a look-alike login site, where employees handed over usernames, passwords and personal details.
The group built its own phishing kit to capture what employees typed into those fake portals. Captured credentials were forwarded automatically to a Telegram channel that, according to the plea, the defendant ran together with another member. With working logins in hand, the conspirators signed in to employee accounts and moved into company systems, taking confidential work product and personal data, including account credentials, names, email addresses and phone numbers.
That corporate data then fed the second stage. The defendants used it to locate cryptocurrency accounts and wallets held by individuals, and to get past two-factor authentication they performed SIM swaps: persuading a mobile carrier to move a victim’s phone number onto a SIM card the conspirators held, which routed one-time codes sent by text or voice call to them instead of the account owner. A device found at the defendant’s residence in Scotland in April 2023 held names and addresses of many individual victims and a text file containing wallet seed phrases and login details for one victim.
What is still unknown
The Justice Department release does not attach a threat-group name to the conspiracy, and we have not assigned one. It also does not say how many individuals lost money, how much of the $11.6 million has been recovered, or which carriers were deceived into the SIM swaps. The restitution hearing may answer part of that. The release does not say whether the stolen corporate data has been recovered or contained, so organisations that suspect they were caught up in an SMS phishing wave of this period should not assume the risk ended with the arrests.
What defenders should prioritise
The techniques here are cheap and repeatable, and the sentences do not retire them. In rough order of payoff:
- Move privileged and support staff off SMS and voice one-time codes. Phishing-resistant authentication, such as FIDO2 security keys or platform passkeys, stops a stolen password and a relayed code from being enough. Start with help desk, IT administration and outsourced support accounts, which usually hold the widest access.
- Treat your suppliers’ branding as an attack surface. The messages impersonated contracted IT and BPO providers. Agree with those suppliers how they will and will not contact your staff, and tell employees plainly that a login link arriving by text is never legitimate.
- Watch for the sign-in pattern a kit leaves behind. A fresh login from an unfamiliar network or device shortly after a staff member clicks a link should trigger session revocation and a password reset, not just an alert.
- Protect customer and employee phone numbers at the carrier. Ask mobile providers for port-out and SIM-change locks on corporate lines, and encourage high-value individuals, including executives, to enable the same protection on personal numbers.
- Keep seed phrases and credentials out of plain files. The text file found on the defendant’s device is a reminder that anything stored in clear text and reachable from a compromised account will be harvested.
Incident responders who find a phishing kit forwarding to a messaging channel should preserve that channel’s identifiers and report the activity to the FBI, which led this investigation with help from Police Scotland and Spain’s national police.
Frequently Asked Questions
What sentence did the UK national receive in the SMS phishing case? He was sentenced to 72 months, or six years, in US federal prison after admitting a wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft. A restitution hearing is set for 11 December.
How did the group steal cryptocurrency from individuals? They used data stolen from breached companies to find victims’ crypto accounts, then performed SIM swaps so that text and voice login codes reached phones they controlled. The thefts totalled at least $11.6 million from victims across the United States.
How can organisations defend against SMS phishing and SIM-swap attacks? Replace SMS and voice codes with phishing-resistant authentication for support and admin staff, and ask carriers to lock SIM changes and number ports on corporate lines. Staff should also be told that a login link sent by text is never legitimate.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice